1: Longrigg
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The map following page 436 has been reproduced according to the following schedule:



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and when of tribal identity was rarely answerable, so short is tribal memory, so vainglorious its love of legend, so vague its sense of time and place. Some tribes were, evidently, consolidated groups of mere neighbours of the same valley or river reach—Zibari or Sawamara. Others sprang from a community formed at an oasis, well, or shrine, with all the accretions, soon assimilated, which a secure livelihood would invite. In others, the bond of original kinship, retained effectively by the ruling family, had been spread wider by intermarriage within the group, and was claimed in sentiment by hundreds of loyal adopted kinsmen admitted, over centuries, from without. Historical or imagined kinship was and is, indeed, the essence of the tribal nucleus.

The size of a tribe could vary from a few tents to great confederacies embracing, with greater or lesser integration, a dozen tribes all under a single paramountcy. But of no aspect of tribal life was it, or is it, more difficult to speak precisely than of the tribe's internal organization or solidarity, or lack of these. One authority is 'under' another only by virtue of admired qualities, birth, age, and consent; and such subjection is always unstable. The Western mind is for ever puzzled by the fragility of tribal authority, upon the skill and firmness of which everything in the tribe would seem to depend.

Amid their many elements of variety, the tribes were uniform in the fundamentals of their outlook, their level stages of evolution, their common feeling of distinctness from the governed townsfolk; and their power for good or evil was enhanced by the remarkable range of personalities whom the scope of their free society allowed to emerge. Whatever the townsman of Baghdad or Mosul might feel about the wildness or avarice of his tribal fellow countrymen—whom he would reluctantly admit as such—he must needs confess the force and individuality of many of the Shaykhs: qualities found equally in a great Shaykh of desert 'Aniza or Shammar, the lord of a few sordid reed huts in the Ḥammar Lake, an Amir of the Rabi'a or Zubayd, or the Aghā of a Kurdish countryside.

For all the tumult of their restless politics and feuds, the tribes' material and social state in 1900 might well seem to an observer fundamentally unchanged for centuries. Yet in fact changes had been long at work: the same, in essence, as were moving among the town populations, and due to the same impacts of the time. The Turkish conception of government had changed, control of tribal areas had replaced mere tax-farming as the objective, modern military forces had become available. Even tribesmen could not be ignorant that Courts had been set up which at least claimed universal jurisdiction, criminals were demanded from their tribal refuges, a Mudir and his handful of *Zaptié* (*ḍhabṭiya*) could appear

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from a headquarters no longer distant, telegraph lines could be seen, postmen rode from town to town. A dozen new townships had been founded in the last decades of the century—Nasiriya in the Muntafiq, 'Amara in the lower Tigris, Kut and Bughayla as river-steamer fuelling points, and new-built Khans with gendarme posts along the main routes. The control of the greater canal heads had become a Government function; more and more the local Governor became the invoked arbiter of tribal quarrels; and the Tapu land records with their registration of communal tribal lands as the private property of the Shaykhs had introduced a new and jarring relationship of landlord and tenant to mar that of chieftain and loyal follower.

Other and less obvious elements were at work to modify the old tribal isolation. Increased awareness of the outside world came with the visits of grain-buying merchants' agents, since the steamship had made bulk export possible. The effects of shipping itself radiated inland from Basra and from the Tigris steamboats. European manufactured goods penetrated into every tribe; and the buyers, the effendis, the *Zaptié* and the city populace whom a tribesman might rarely visit, were themselves reflectors, in their kind and degree, of a faint light of Western innovation in the world of speech, ideas, and comparisons. Few of the foreign travellers of the 'nineties failed to comment on the social progress of the last quarter-century and on the greater penetration by Government of the outlying regions.

The Dhafir in the south-western desert, astride the route into Najd, lived on bad terms with ibn Rashid and raided the Mutayr and 'Aniza. The 'Aniza, greatest of nomadic groups of northern Arabia, held the Shamiya desert from Najf to Hit. Their chief, ibn Hadhdhal, titular Qa'immaqam of Razaza, now courted and now imprisoned by the Turks, pursued his ancient feuds with the Shammar, and flouted the Government. The Dulaym were by 1900 largely settled and in part disciplined by the chain of police posts along the Aleppo road.

The Shammar had long passed their great days of formidable unity. Intermittently at war with an outstanding personality of the time, Ibrahim Pasha of the Milli Kurds—bandit, patriarch, general of Hamidiya, protégé of Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid—they were bitterly divided by factions among the sons of Farhan Pasha, and could play off the authority of Mosul against Dayr al-Zur, loot the river traffic, withhold their taxes, and alternately court and reject the favours of Government.

On the lower Euphrates the power of the Sa'dun overlords over a complex of Shi'i tribes was in division and decline. For a generation two separate schools of leadership had appeared: the attempt

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traffic. One or two free-lance enterprises were additional to these —a Baṣra-owned steamer plying to Baghdad, another weekly from Baghdad to Samarrā; many abortive projects had been formed for larger development. The Saniya Administration had advanced plans, in 1890, for an extended service to include voyages to Mosul and even to Jazira-ibn-'Umar, and a new survey of the Euphrates was ordered in preparation for free navigation from Maskana or Jarablus to Baṣra. Nothing resulted from these projects, but the advancing shadow of the Baghdad Railway, with which their authors loved to connect them, gave encouragement. A ship-building yard was established at Baghdad in 1890.

The port of Baṣra, sole sea gateway of 'Iraq, carried by far the greatest part of its trade and traffic, of which in 1900 a negligible part was other than British or British-Indian. Russian and German trade was not yet established, while the 'Iraqis contributed little to the movements of the port. The Shaṭṭ al-'Arab waterway, thanks to survey and buoying by British hands, gave access and security to anchorages opposite the 'Ashar and Khandaq creeks which connected it with Baṣra city. The management of the port was primitive, quarantine and customs provisions inept, vexatious, and venal. No wharves, cranes, sheds or other port equipment were provided; loading and discharging overside to and from lighters in midstream were slow and costly operations.

Since the 'sixties of the century 'Iraq had had its place in the world's telegraphic system. It was connected through Fao with India, through Mosul and Jazira-ibn-'Umar with the rest of Turkey, through Khaniqin (or through Fao and Bushire) with Persia. The handling of traffic was slow and unreliable. But the extension of the system to most parts of 'Iraq, vulnerable and faltering as it was, and with Kurdish districts still unpenetrated, had yet done much to assist administration and to modernize society. Postal services dated in some form from the eighteenth century. In the 'sixties of the nineteenth, British-Indian steamers began to carry the Indian and European mails to Baṣra, where the service connected with the river steamers. The Indian Post Offices opened in 1868. The British camel mail to Damascus, discontinued in 1886 after a century of service, was replaced by a Turkish mail along the same route, carried by 'Aniza tribal riders. The time-honoured horse-borne Tatar mail left Baghdad every Monday for Istanbul, by way of Mosul and Diyarbakr.

7. THE GOVERNMENT

The enormous difficulties of governing the three wilayas arose, it is now clear, from a complex of elements. The territory was ill provided with means of communication, and much of it was

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impassable mountain or swamp. The governing authority was foreign, unloved, and deadly poor. None but a minute fraction of the population was ready to welcome efficient government; the greatest part repudiated it as alien to their ways and interests. The 'Iraqis were and are of independent, individualistic character, unaccustomed to control. Faction in the towns and endless tribal warfare had been the rule for centuries. The deep division between town and tribe was itself a major obstacle to uniform administration; to it was added the gulf between the Sunni and Shi'i communities. Such was the territory which for four centuries the Ottoman Government, acclaimed almost universally by Western opinion as the world's worst, had been trying to administer.

The Government of 1900 of which we speak, and its approach to these problems, differed indeed essentially from that of three generations earlier. In the original form of Ottoman rule, which was pure Oriental despotism, all power was the Sultan's. He stood at the head of an elaborate hierarchy of stratified functionaries, and was represented by governors locally as autocratic as himself. Rule was for his sole benefit and grandeur; no law existed save the Shara', capriciously enforced; no limit or appeal restricted the local powers of Wali or Mutasallim. All posts were for sale, including those of the highest functionaries.

Changes in this régime had been forced upon the Ottoman dynasty early in the nineteenth century by its military defeats, which compelled it to invoke European military teachers. And while successive Sultans were led by this necessity to rebase the conception and machinery of Government with a new body of law and procedure and a new class of officials, other modernizing agencies were at work: those of trade and shipping, educational foundations, travellers, missions, modern communications, and a press. To this impact of the West urgency was imparted by the attitude of Turkey's European creditors and the reaction in Europe to the miseries of the Christian provinces successively detached from the Empire. Under such pressures was evolved the half-modern, pretentious, overburdened, needy Turkish Government of the nineteenth century. For seventy years before 1900 'Iraq had enjoyed the blessings of 'reformed' Government, had seen its Administration modified first on paper and then in fact, with every new meticulous Ordinance in Midhat Pasha's revised wilaya system. With regulations to apply and functions specialized, a numerous and influential class had come into existence, the effendis. Neither landowners nor merchants nor divines, they were of a middle and secular class, complacently urban. 'Iraqi by race except in the highest posts, the effendis formed a great part of the social element receptive of Turkish culture, and acted as the

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main bridge between Turk and Arab. Old-fashioned Muslims or cynical free-thinkers, xenophobe or professedly cosmopolitan, every type was to be found in their ranks. Barely literate, persistent Turkish-speakers, backward but decorous in social habit, uniform in their travesty of European dress, too frequently corrupt and remote from all spirit of public service, they identified the body politic with their own class, contemptuous of tribe and cultivator. Ill-paid and ambitious, they could not prudently rely on merit alone; nepotism was rampant, no intrigue or appeal neglected. The civil service of 'Iraq in 1900 must, by any save contemporary Asiatic standards, rank low; yet it contained, at all levels and all times, not a few honest and high-minded men.

The division of Turkish provincial territory into wilayas, sanjaqs, qadhās, and nahiyas is familiar. The administrative units corresponded generally to no geographical divisions, and were often ill conceived. Changes of status and boundary and the creation of new units were not uncommon. The 'Iraq of 1900 showed, in all, four fewer sanjaqs than there were liwās in 1950, a score fewer qadhās, two score fewer nahiyas. Qadhās were graded as first, second, and third class; they differed no less in size, population, and administrative difficulties. Some were suburban, others wholly tribal, others, such as Razaza or Kuwayt, no more than nominal. Walis and Mutaṣarrifs were appointed by imperial decree, lesser administrative officials locally by the Wali. Frequent repostings and dismissals reflected an uneasy underworld of intrigue and tale-bearing, and were fatal to continuity.

The Wali as the representative of the Sultan dealt with the heads of local communities, foreign consuls, and the greater tribal chiefs. The general and non-departmental administration was in his hands. He directed the municipalities, 'settled' tribal disputes which defied settlement, heard multifarious grievances, and through the Daftardar influenced or controlled the all-important field of land revenue. At every wilaya and subordinate headquarters sat an Administrative Council composed partly of officials, partly of elected members who included Christian and Jewish representatives. The maintenance of law and order depended upon the Gendarmerie—the *Zaptié* familiar to European travellers. This force, organized and commanded on military lines, was administered by the War Office but placed at the disposal of the local Government. Ill-paid and greedy, half-equipped and unkempt and used for every purpose of escort, message-carrying, and even domestic service, the *Zaptié* yet lacked neither loyalty nor hardihood, and did much or most to keep the administration in being.

Over many of the departments operating in his area, the local

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Governor had only a general power of co-ordination and discipline. These departments, directed from Istanbul, included the administration of justice: a field in which Turkish law had by 1900 developed far beyond its Shara' origins. The composite and ill-coded civil Majalla, a mass of *ad hoc* legislation, and a body of French commercial law had been adopted. The resulting codes were not only imperfectly drafted and full of anomalies, but too often quite unsuited to 'Iraqi needs. The Courts which administered them represented a comprehensive and not ill-considered system spoiled by the delays and abuses in its practical working, by its exclusive use of a foreign language, and by the underpaying of the judges. The privileged position of foreigners, protected by their outdated and resented Capitulations, was assured by special arrangements in both civil and criminal matters.

Abundant work for the Courts was provided by the department of Land Registry, or Tapu. It had been inaugurated in 'Iraq by Midhat Pasha as a land-settlement and stabilizing measure; but in unsurveyed agricultural lands, largely in immemorial tribal possession and far from conforming to the official view that 'unalienated State lands' were at Government's free disposal, the Tapu system could do little save create new disputes, bestow rights on parties powerless to exercise them, and destroy the best elements in the shaykh–tribesman relationship. The immense practical difficulties of land settlement in 'Iraq were unrealized, and the whole essential background of cadastral survey and social control was lacking.

In the field of medicine and quarantine the standard of Turkish doctors (rarely Turkish by race) was low, their assistants and inspectors were untrained, their equipment was inadequate. The medical services, accustomed to rely on mission hospitals and dispensaries, were scanty in the towns and non-existent outside. Educational services made a slightly better showing, though standards were everywhere below those of the foreign or foreign-inspired mission schools. Free primary schools, well organized on paper, existed at most towns, and secondary also at the larger. Industrial schools had been founded at Baghdad and Basra, and higher theological learning was available. The military educational system was distinct. The sons of civil notables and high officials went to Istanbul to complete their Turkish education, and a few sons of the greater shaykhs to the Tribal College. The teaching profession was ill reputed and unpopular, its methods primitive.

These do not conclude the list of the 'imperial' departments. The Public Debt administration, handling selected revenues on behalf of the European creditors of the Porte: the local offices of the Régie Co-intéressée who held the monopoly for the manufacture

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If it was at times urged forward by its few modernists and by the example of the local minorities, it was retarded by retrograde self-interested elements in 'Iraqi as in Turkish society. Above all, 'Balik Başdan Kokar'—the fish putrefies from its head downwards: 'Iraq was but part of an Empire whose central government in 1900 was an inept and seedy despotism distracted by constant alarms and suspicions, lectured by the Powers, preyed on by adventurers, working by spies and tale-bearers, and rotten with corruption and nepotism. There was at Sublime Porte and Yildiz alike more willingness to gain time and weaken opposition by playing off rival forces, bribing the dangerous and reassuring with false promises, than to initiate clean and effective government, of which even the ideal as well as all the material means were lacking. From this central government the 'Iraq wilayas depended, from its ranks came the senior officials to every sanjaq and department, and to it the intriguers and malcontents of 'Iraq could bear their tales.

Economically, as has been seen, great hopes had been formed of 'Iraq development. Politically, it was the Sultan's way to woo the important town families—and notably those of religious pretension—by favours and courtesies: to encourage Sunni shrines and charities: to stress the Caliphate aspect of his rule: to be known as planning a railway to Mecca and Madina: to increase pan-Islamic preaching to align Arab with Turk: and to retain an Arab personal bodyguard. Towards its tribal problem the policy was that to which any government must sooner or later have been driven: in the impossibility of finding tribal elements capable of loyal vassaldom, and the certainty that the shaykhs would always abuse all power permitted to them, it could only be a policy of the introduction of direct rule by practicable stages. But such a project was resisted by nine-tenths of the tribal leaders, because it was fatal to their own favoured position; its enforcement therefore involved a ceaseless struggle by Government to assert its paramountcy and to drive the shaykhs to acquiescence. The varying character of Governors and the poverty of their resources led to many inconsistencies, nor was it always possible to make military demonstrations or launch successful punitive columns. It seemed at times more politic to overlook flagrant offence, to support a paramount shaykh or even to name him (as had happened) Governor of the sanjaq itself; and sometimes the shaykh could, in defiance of all policy, buy his requirements of authority or impunity for cash. 'The sword—and the sugar!' was the Turkish administrator's formula for 'Iraq.

As to politics, under the Ḥamidiyan régime political life could not be expected. It was precluded by the static and alien nature of Government, and by the pervasive spy system. Towards the Turkish Government as a whole there could be no 'Iraqi attitude

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The railways when at their greatest extent they were handed over by the Army in April 1920, consisted of nearly 1,000 miles of track.[1] The absorption into the 'Iraq economy of this rapidly constructed and ill-equipped system, with its decrepit engines and rolling-stock and an alignment designed to serve military purposes, was to be no easy task. The Director in 1919–20 was Colonel G. Lubbock. The labour which the Railway used was, at this stage, almost entirely Indian.

The financial procedures for handing over to a Civil Administration the capital works constructed from Army funds were the subject of a mission sent to 'Iraq under Sir John Hewitt; the assets were valued at £2 million, excluding the Railway, and had mostly taken forms unrelated to civilian needs. The giant river fleet of the (military) Inland Water Transport, on the other hand, was never transferred to the Administration nor were its units sold locally by auction, as was the great mass of unneeded military stores. They were instead, amid storms of protest from the Civil Commissioner and 'Iraqi and British commercial interests, disposed of at Bombay by Lord Inchcape on behalf of the British Government. The civilian Tigris fleet was thereafter by degrees reduced to its pre-war scale. The Lynch (Euphrates and Tigris) Company had lost the *Julnar* and some minor craft, but in 1920 acquired the imposing *Zenobia* and *Zobaida* (both built in 1916), modernized its equipment and installations, and retained in operation the veteran *Blosse Lynch*, *Khalifa*, *Mejidieh*, and the *Malamir* from their pre-war Karun service. The Lynch management of the E.T.S.N. Company's fleet was after 1919 merged in a fusion of their interests with those of Messrs. Gray Mackenzie & Co., forming the Mesopotamia–Persia Corporation—'Mespers'—at Baghdad and Baṣra. Local competition on the river was no longer Government-organized, and most of the pre-war vessels had disappeared;[2] but it still handled an appreciable share of the traffic.

In the provincial Government, a close approximation to the Turkish administrative units was retained. The Division represented usually the former sanjaq or liwā, and the District the qaḍhā, while the naḥiyas were little changed. The sixteen Divisions

[1] The mileages of metre-gauge line were: Baghdad–Baṣra 352 miles, Baghdad–Persian frontier 130, Baghdad–Kut 158, Zubayr–Jabal Sanam 23, Ur–Naṣiriya 10, Qaraghan (on the Khaniqin line) to Kinqarban (outside Kifri) 23, with 36 miles in the port area of Baṣra and Ma'qil. The standard-gauge line, Baghdad–Sharqaṭ, was of 186 miles; the narrow-gauge, Baghdad–Kifl 21, and Baghdad–Faluja 38.

[2] The *Baghdadi*, Asfar's *Étoile de l'Orient*, the *Furat*, the *Risafa*, and a number of German-owned launches of the Société de Transports Fluviaux, had been sunk by the Turks to block waterways and impede British operations. The *Basra* was sent to Europe but did not get farther than Malta. The *Barhaniya* and *Hamidiya* were blown up by the Turks to avoid capture. The *Baghdad* reached Mosul—the first steamer to do so—and was there captured by the British.

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in 1919 were those of 'Amara, Baghdad, Ba'quba, Baṣra, Dayr al-Zūr, Diwaniya, Dulaym, Ḥilla (including Karbalā), Khaniqin, Kirkuk, Kut al-Amara, Mosul, Muntafiq, Samarrā, Shamiya (including Najf), Sulaymaniya. Of these, Dayr was soon to pass from 'Iraqi to Syrian keeping, Khaniqin and Ba'quba were later to form a single liwā, Kut was to lose its divisional status (but to regain it in 1922), Shamiya to be degraded into a district of Diwaniya, and Samarrā into one of Baghdad; but Karbalā with Najf was later to form a separate Division, as was Arbil. Each Division was the command of a Political Officer, and within it under his Assistants were grouped two or more districts, within which the familiar naḥiyas under 'Iraqi Mudirs preserved the routine and nomenclature of their predecessors. At Divisional headquarters the formation of nominated advisory Divisional Councils of notables and officials, under the Political Officer's chairmanship, was a step taken in early post-war days. It intended to associate the public, to some formal and limited extent, with the Administration; but the Councils, however well chosen, were too powerless to be of effective service, and did not survive the stormy days of 1920. The Political Officer represented the authority of the Civil Commissioner (indeed, that of His Majesty's Government itself) and controlled all departments. His powers—administrative, financial, and judicial—were delegated in a suitable measure to his Assistants in districts, whose primary functions were to keep the peace, to know and to handle the tribes, and to collect the revenues.

The merits and shortcomings of this improvised Administration form a study of some interest. To an unusual extent its tone was determined by the high-minded, dominating character of A. T. Wilson, which imposed itself upon the small body of officers who essayed to carry out his policy: a policy of forthright, efficient, paternal Government in the interest of the masses—and especially of the tribesmen—but unsympathetic to local politics or nationalist aspirations. The problem created for his Administration by post-war demobilization and the claims of other services was solved by retaining some but not all of his best officers, and borrowing others from other Arabic-speaking territories, or from regiments leaving 'Iraq. The resulting standard, while not unmixed with inferior elements, was generally high in energy, personal integrity, and good intentions. The complexities of their tasks, and the deeper currents of opposition which developed, were commonly underrated—often with immediately tragic results—by these light-hearted amateur administrators, and even by the few experienced veterans eminent among them. The day-by-day attitude of the Administration was neither illiberal nor repressive, the establishment of cordial relations between governor and governed was

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642 645x own status and procedure. The supreme authority of the High Commissioner was recognized, and was required for confirmation of almost all Acts of State and the higher administrative appointments. The rôle of the ministerial British Advisers was heavy and all-pervasive. Nevertheless, Cox could announce on 11 November 1920 that, pending the calling of the General Elective Assembly authorized by the Notification of 17 June, a provisional National Government had been established: that its Council of State consisted of a President and Ministers for Interior, Finance, Justice, Education and Health, Defence, Public Works, Commerce, and Awqaf, and other ministers without portfolio: and that 'until the organic law is promulgated and brought into effect the Council of State Ministers shall be responsible for the conduct, subject to my supervision and control, of the administration of Government, excluding foreign affairs, military operations, and in general military affairs except as concerned solely the locally recruited forces'.

The British Advisers to the Ministries were appointed at the same time: H. St. J. B. Philby to Interior, S. H. Slater to Finance and to act in Commerce, Major-General Atkinson to Communications and Works, Major G. F. Eadie to act in Defence, Sir E. Bonham-Carter in Justice, E. L. Norton in Health and Education, and R. S. Cooke in Awqaf.

645x The Council of Ministers, dignified and deliberate, proceeded to the dispatch of business. Arrangements were made under pressure from Ja'far Pasha for the organized repatriation from Syria of Faysal's 'Iraqi officers, who, hotly nationalist and as yet doubtfully disposed towards the new British-sponsored compromise régime, could not but form an important element in 'Iraq politics. A number of politicians deported in 1920 from 'Iraq to Hanjam Island in the Persian Gulf for subversive agitation were permitted to return; the remainder were to be released under the general amnesty proclaimed in June 1921. Work was begun in Committee on a revision of the all-important Electoral Law, a task begun by Sayid Ṭalib Pasha's conclave of ex-deputies in August. It proved intractable; the High Commissioner favoured, the ministers disliked, separate representation for the tribes. These, though they formed a great majority of the population, would without such a provision secure no parliamentary spokesmen at all. A first draft of the revised law was unsatisfactory, if only because, among other defects, it ignored the special rights of the Kurds under the Sèvres Treaty. The completion of the draft was willingly postponed by the Minister of the Interior, Sayid Ṭalib, whose own ambitions, it seemed to some, made him reluctant for elections to be held at all until his own plans were mature.

631 The reorganization of the provincial government on a plan

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published in December 1920 involved a general restoration of Turkish administrative units, with the temporary loss of improvements made in 1918 to 1920. It involved also the complete separation of judicial from executive functions, an innovation—or restoration of Turkish methods, in this case salutary—which led to the immediate need at all levels for more judges and magistrates; and these the Ministry of Justice, progressive from the first in the use of responsible 'Iraqis, was not unsuccessful in supplying. The 'Iraqi Mutaṣarrifs and Qa'immaqams who, except in Sulaymaniya liwā and with caution on the middle Euphrates, were now everywhere substituted for British Political Officers and their Assistants as the effective governors of the provinces, represented all types, all ages, and all degrees of merit and honesty among ex-Turkish officialdom. The almost exclusively Sunni Government followed Turkish tradition by making, it was remarked, no Shi'i appointments save, inevitably, in the Holy Cities. The new provincial régime which allowed initially for 10 liwās, 35 qaḍhās, and 85 naḥiyas, was the most obvious indication to the public that an 'Iraq Government was now a reality. It incorporated in each liwā one or more British officers as Advisers (later, Administrative Inspectors), an arrangement which promised to work on the whole satisfactorily and to the credit of both elements. There were in places regrettable lapses to Turkish standards, and elsewhere signs of administration on lines of political partiality; at Mosul the incoming Mutaṣarrif was promptly murdered; and in some cases the 'Iraqi executive, more experienced and not less able than his British supervisory colleague, resented the relationship. But on the whole the new machine worked with general acceptance and little friction.

Progress was made early in 1921 towards the construction of an 'Iraq Army. It was intended firstly for the defence functions which must devolve upon it with the withdrawal of British forces which, already in progress, was vociferously urged by press and politicians in Great Britain; and, secondly, to offer employment to the potentially dangerous military caste. To absorb the existing Levies, now a force over 2,000 strong with excellent discipline and record, into the 'Iraq Army would involve fundamental changes in the former, with the replacement of almost all its officers by newcomers. This plan was rejected; the Levies were instead placed temporarily under the Minister of the Interior, and retained a separate existence. The Ministry of Defence spent the first half of 1921 in elaborating departments, a staff, terms of service, and all other preliminaries for the Army. Nuri Pasha al-Sa'id, brother-in-law of Ja'far Pasha and himself a brilliant officer and pre-1914 'Iraqi patriot, returned from Syria to become its Chief of Staff. A Military College was opened in July 1921.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

652 moment when the public of a new State would hope for eager development. Hospitals and dispensaries must, for the time, be barely maintained: schools could be only slightly increased, secondary and technical education could expand far less than the public desire and need indicated. The Ministry of Health and Education was divided into two, that of Health later to become a mere Department of Interior. Few public works, it was evident, could be attempted; roads must remain rough unsurfaced tracks. The Agricultural Department could but continue its work of research and demonstration upon a minor scale, that of Irrigation must be content with maintenance and minor works.

631 In the liwās,[1] the alterations from Turkish administrative units and their grouping which had been made in the period from 1917 to 1920 were gradually reintroduced. The status of Sulaymaniya, as will be seen, varied from month to month. Kut, detached from Baghdad, became a liwā early in 1922. Arbil, a sub-liwā of Kirkuk in 1921, was separated from it in 1923. Diwaniya broke off from Hilla. No more was heard of Baṣra separatism. The Divisional Councils of pre-insurrection days were dead; the Turkish 'Administrative Councils' of officials and notables returned to life at each liwā and qadhā. 'Iraqi administrative officials, Mutaṣarrifs and Qa'immaqams, set to work amicably in most areas with their British colleagues, who, almost to a man, loyally supported the new régime; but in the provinces, as in the central Government, the difficulties of divided control were soon, though not everywhere, to manifest themselves.

632 In the municipalities, a number of the services installed by the British Army were passed over to the Mayors and their Councils. The latter from early in 1922 were no longer nominated but once again chosen by election under the reintroduced Turkish regulations. Municipal pride developed, and signs of keen local initiative —cramped, unfortunately, by poverty—were apparent in the three 204 larger and many smaller towns. Newspapers, all privately owned save at Kirkuk and Sulaymaniya, began to multiply; and an 'Iraq 747 *Government Gazette* came into being. Literary and charitable 814 institutions revived or came to birth, designed not least to combat

[1] The British Administrative Inspectors in liwās or in the Ministry of Interior, early in 1923, were: C. J. Edmonds, G. V. B. Gillan, C. C. Aston,* S. G. C. Murray, H. M. Flaxman, E. C. H. Alban,* W. A. Lyon,* A. F. Miller,* E. S. Berry,* L. Kettlewell, S. E. Hedgcock, H. C. Pulley, R. E. Alderman,* W. C. F. A. Wilson,* L. M. Yetts, G. C. Kitching,* J. F. D. Jeffreys, L. W. Reed, S. H. Longrigg, A. H. Ditchburn,* H. I. Lloyd,* and R. F. Jardine.*

Those marked * were still so employed in 1927, with the addition of C. Grice, A. J. B. Chapman, J. B. Glubb (p. 291). Gillan, Murray, Flaxman, Kettlewell, Reed, and Jeffreys had left 'Iraq, Pulley had died, and Longrigg and Hedgcock had moved to Finance. Thereafter no more Administrative Inspectors were recruited, except R. S. Stafford (1928–33), from the Sudan.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

adopted by the King and his entourage from the first. He had been led by Mr. Churchill in London, he complained, to envisage a very different form of Treaty: the Mandate must go, disappear, be repudiated! And if it be urged that a debatable nicety of constitutional or international law was an unrealistic or scarcely sufficient basis—and one important only to a tiny minority of 'Iraqis—on which to found, as did the political 'Iraqis of 1921 to 1930, a ten-year campaign of political struggle, marked by civil resistance, murder, and intended insurrection, it remains true that the Mandate did in fact involve an imperfect independence and an affront to national pride damaging, it was claimed, to 'Iraq in Islamic eyes everywhere.

As Treaty discussions in the Cabinet proceeded early in 1922, the strata of public opinion on the matter became clearer. Extreme nationalists, who included, for their own different reasons, the Shi'i 'Ulamā and leading supporters and even intimates of the King, cried out against mandated 'slavery' and demanded complete British evacuation: an outcry which did not fail to produce by reaction an 'English' party of notables and shaykhs favourable, they said, to effective British rule. More moderate nationalists, whose views the King personally shared, stood for abrogation of the Mandate, a friendly and equal Treaty, and continued British support. The cleavage in opinion grew more specific after a conference called at Karbalā in April 1922, nominally to protest against Ikhwan raiding, by Shaykh Mahdi al-Khaliṣi, a Shi'i 'Alim devoted to politics. The conference, attended by some 200 Shi'i notables, 'Ulamā, and tribesmen, was watched with uneasiness by the moderate parties, and, in spite of the colourless resolution finally passed, was effective in rallying anti-Treaty opinion; it was productive also of indiscipline and near-anarchy in the sensitive Muntafiq and Shamiya districts. A further evil now clearly visible and likely to increase was the 'political' administration in some of the Euphrates areas, by strongly nationalistic Mutaṣarrifs and Qa'immaqams. These, ignoring their advisory British colleagues, openly favoured the 'patriot' shaykhs in their land disputes and revenue assessments, and frowned upon the 'English' faction. Newspaper articles in the capital grew ever more violent, street demonstrations were attempted in Baghdad, deputations waited upon the King. The Cabinet sustained changes in March 1922, by the resignation of five ministers, who included Naji al-Suwaydi, 'Izzat Pasha of Kirkuk, and 'Abd al-Laṭif Mandil of Baṣra. The ministers who replaced these included Tawfiq Bey al-Khalidi, a senior official of superior type who had been a Turkish deputy and lately Mayor of Baghdad: Ṣubiḥ Nasha't, a Turko-Kurd of outstanding energy and rich humour: 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey al-Sa'dun,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

kept him from trespassing into Ḥalabja and other 'Iraq-administered districts, and drove him frequently into Persia. He failed to secure the co-operation of the Jaf, was not uniformly successful in robbing their migratory sections, and desperately lacked funds to maintain his supporters. In Rawanduz area there was now no direct Turkish activity, and the cleavage in the Pishdar was ended by a reconciliation in favour of Babakr Aghā. On the northern frontier the significant feature of the period, apart from the Commission's visit and the immigration of Christians expelled from Turkey, was the influx of Kurdish refugees from the areas in which the Kurdish rebellion, headed by Shaykh Sa'id the Naqshbandi in February 1925 and at first widely successful, had led to firm or fierce Turkish reprisals. Escaping parties were led into 'Iraq by a son of Sayid 'Abd al-Qadir of Neri, and by a son and a brother of Shaykh Sa'id himself. These refugees were settled in 'Iraq territory in places remote from the frontier. In early 1926 further large bodies of trans-frontier Kurds sought refuge in Mosul wilaya. They included numbers of the Miran under Na'if Bey in February, who were settled in their own winter grazing area on the Tigris, and 7,000 of the Goyan in April. These were followed by a thousand Christians from the Tur 'Abdin area, and later by nearly 10,000, it was said, of the Artushi pouring into 'Amadiya area under the pressure of Turkish forces which had defeated and evicted them. The problem posed to the 'Iraq authorities by these unwanted and nearly destitute folk, whom the Turks refused to re-admit, was seriously embarrassing.

In general, the outlook at this period for the Kurdish area of 'Iraq seemed favourable. They were unaffected by the uprising and repression in Turkish Kurdistan. Normal administration of an elementary type prevailed in all four of the Kurdish liwās, save in a small Persian-frontier area of Sulaymaniya. Reasonable allowance was being made, with a good grace, for Kurdish susceptibilities in matters of language, law, procedure, schools, and the appointment of officials. Hundreds of Kurds were serving the 'Iraq State in civil and military posts at every level. Every corner of their own countryside had been penetrated by the disciplined forces—Army, Levies, Police—of the Government. Roads had been built or improved and were patrolled, telegraphs were extended, the tobacco trade encouraged and organized. Municipal government was progressing, security was general. Kurds sat in the Chamber of Deputies, in the Senate, and in the Cabinet. Their complete integration in the 'Iraq State seemed a not impossible hope.

The often-debated Assyrian question was by the spring of 1926 still far from settlement to their satisfaction, but it had at least passed for ever out of one phase, that of attempted repatriation to

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

wise and moderate 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Qaṣṣab. By the summer of 1926 the routine of parliamentary procedure was established; but it was already clear that the backwardness of the electorate, and the freely used power of the Government to secure the election of deputies of its own choice, could not but preclude any early possibility of genuine democracy.

The Administration, on lines half inherited from the Turks and half established by the British, had well begun. With many shortcomings and omissions it operated already more widely and more effectively than had any Turkish Government, and aimed at a superior standard of service. In Baghdad the departments under each Ministry improved their organization, sifted their staffs, advanced towards complete 'Iraqi control. By 1926 not only were all Ministries in effective 'Iraqi control but most of the larger departments had been handed to 'Iraqi directors, notably those of Health, Education, Agriculture, Posts and Telegraphs, Government Accounts, Police, Prisons, the Census; those of Irrigation, Tapu, Customs, Revenue and State Domains, Veterinary services, Public Works, the Port of Baṣra, and 'Iraq Railways remained for a further period under British executive control. In the provinces, new qadhās and nahiyas were formed or regrouped. The position of the British 'Administrative Inspectorate' was satisfactorily defined by law. A Standing Board selected 'Iraqi officials for higher posts, and the formation of a regulated civil service on modern lines was taken in hand. The Ministry of Finance, where R. V. Vernon assumed the Advisership in 1925 after an interregnum under L. M. Swan, had developed and specialized its organization, reduced its non-'Iraqi staff to a minimum, and founded a Finance Inspectorate. The post of Auditor-General, reporting to the Cabinet direct, was created in 1924 and held by J. Parlby, who had worked in 'Iraqi finances since 1917. The Advisership of Communications and Works was held by Wheatley until the arrival of L. E. Bury in 1925, and again after the latter's departure three years later. In Interior, Cornwallis was assisted by a senior member of his Administrative Inspectorate—Pulley, Wilson, or Edmonds—and by one or more juniors.

The Courts offered justice and accessibility to an extent far superior to that of alien and corrupt Ottoman tribunals; during these years both civil and criminal courts multiplied at liwā and qadhā headquarters as need declared itself, and the statistics of cases heard showed an increasing recourse to law. Civil jurisdiction lay with the Peace Courts of the Qadhis—who after 1923 included Shi'i Qadhis—and junior judges, the Courts of First Instance at three or four liwā headquarters, and a single Court of Appeal and Cassation, with a British President, at Baghdad. This President

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

(from the present writer), of Income Tax (from Sainsbury), of Public Works (from Clay); these were to be closely followed by that of Irrigation (from Allard) in 1933, of Tapu (from Alderman, who died) in 1934, and of Antiquities in 1934. Progress towards raising the standard for officials, the object of successive boards, commissions, and examinations, was fluctuating; the work of one minister in re-selecting and purifying the personnel was undone by the next, and was rarely free from personal factors. In the task of fixing establishments and regulations, as in all Government activities, the discontinuity of frequently changed Cabinets was an obstacle to progress. Nevertheless, a fair standard was achieved in a body of officials no longer exclusively ex-Turkish veterans, no longer alien, and far superior to anything seen in Ottoman times for honesty, goodwill, and energy. Corruption if not unknown was rarely scandalous and, as never before, sincerely condemned.

The Courts continued, not without an occasional scandal, to earn general respect. The standard of the judiciary was respectable and some 'Iraqi jurists were of high merit. With accessibility, recourse to the Courts grew commoner: 13,000 Peace Court cases were heard in 1919, 63,000 in 1929. Seventy-three advocates were licensed to practise in the former of these years, 165 in the latter.

New administrative units—qadhās and nahiyas—were formed by regrading and subdividing as need occurred; examples were common in Kurdistan, and in the Southern Desert Province formed in 1928 for better frontier control. New groupings among the departments in Baghdad led to changes of ministerial function and nomenclature; but the object of these—the better handling of projects of development—and indeed administrative progress in every field, was for the time partly frustrated by the economic depression of the years 1929 to 1932.

The years of penury and near-crisis preceding the entry of 'Iraq into the League called for wise and firm financial management. The general fall in prices of agricultural products led to a severe drop in land revenue, which the fall in Customs and other receipts aggravated. At the same time essential expenditure did not decrease, and the campaigns in Kurdistan made exceptional demands. The slump and its social effects would have been more severe had 'Iraq been an exporter of manufactured goods; instead, her raw products continued in some demand at lower prices, and it was possible at least to maintain the standards of the public services, and to help distressed pump-cultivators to survive. The State's finances were, under prudent advice, well handled, with careful budgeting, strict accountancy, and measures of economy which demanded some political courage. Vernon left the Adviser-ship to the Ministry in 1928, succeeded for three years by Swan as

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The Health Department, criticized for an unprecedented malaria epidemic in Baghdad in 1936, seemed to call for reform and for a broader activity which should include the rural and backward areas as well as the towns. The period was one of many municipal improvements and considerable building and town-planning. Electric power and light, widened streets, a modern water-supply, improved conservancy, municipal gardens—these were now features of all but the humblest *baladiyas*. It was, indeed, the policy of Yasin Pasha to encourage the devolution of the local services into municipal hands, and funds were provided accordingly; later Prime Ministers followed his example. The passage into law of a Labour Code in 1936 reflected pressure on Government to insist, at least ostensibly, on something of modern standards in the treatment of industrial workers; but the Code had for the moment little practical effect. A law of 1935 prohibiting non-'Iraqis from practising certain trades seemed to threaten domiciled Indians, and was suitably amended and scarcely enforced. The 1936 law abolishing, under severe penalties, the use of Turkish titles—Pasha, Bey, and Effendi—in favour of the simple Arabic 'Sayid'—Master, or Mr.—was widely ignored among the general public and by Europeans, as indeed by Ministers themselves and by others in authority.

The application of the National Service Law, passed in 1934, devolved upon the Hashimi Ministry and could not but be imperfect. Wide tribal areas were in practice exempt; the accessible and the weak were exploited. Armed resistance, as has been seen, was not infrequent, desertion was common, and the payment of a low exemption fee to escape service was habitual. The machinery of recruitment was inefficient, census lists inaccurate, and the resulting military forces habitually below their authorized strength. Nevertheless, the 'Iraq Army, with its British Military Mission constantly in support, improved its training and equipment and its housing facilities, and was highly favoured by King Ghazi. Increasing from some 11,500 men in 1933 to double that number by the end of 1936, it was now organized in two divisions and, territorially, into four districts. Its armament and capacity were sufficient for internal purposes, its corps of officers good in the lower, indifferent or poor in the higher ranks. Unused on any operations in 1934—a unique event—the Army was busy with tribal suppression in the two years following, and was shortly to emerge as the arbiter of 'Iraq's political destinies. The Royal 'Iraq Air Force grew from a few machines to three formed squadrons.

The small surviving force of 'Iraq Levies, some 1,500 strong, was now specialized to aerodrome-guard duties under R.A.F. Command, and the Assyrian monopoly therein had been broken

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

American 'military aid' assistance, and was visited by the British Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. The Mutaṣarrifs, after a slow start, began before the end of 1950 seriously to use the powers which were theirs under the Liwā Administration Law, and provincial administration, it could be hoped, would show henceforth a picture of livelier initiative as greater funds became available. Manifestations of local Communism were less evident, and when they appeared were suppressed by police action; but its vitality was still clear in the tone of press articles, in the streets and meetings in Sulaymaniya, and in busy if temporarily invisible cells among the Port, railway, and oil company workers. Its most formidable strength lay among these and among the bitter and dissatisfied young politicians who despaired of social reform for the people, or advancement for themselves, unless by revolution: who distrusted and indeed detested the Western Powers for their Palestine policies and their seeming support of conservatism: and who advocated a policy of strict international neutrality, if not of positive adhesion to the Russian bloc—a policy strong in its appeal to considerable elements other than Communist. When the Korean war forced the Arab States to define their position between the two world groups, 'Iraq followed the majority of the League members in approving the Western Powers' resistance, but unlike Turkey offered no practical help; if Northern Korean invaders were to be withstood, why had not Zionist?

If the question of the international attitude to be adopted was a main cause of division in Baghdad, there were others. The dilemma of the 'Iraqi Jews, many of whom had braved the law by escaping from the country in 1948 and 1949 and more had followed when martial law ceased, was met by a law of March 1950. Strongly attacked in the Senate, it permitted these departures with forfeiture of 'Iraqi nationality and with the right for each emigrant to take a mere 50 dinars from the country. By the end of 1950, 90,000 Jews had registered their names to leave the territory, and 20,000 had already left. The transport supplied was that of an American air transport company, who enjoyed a monopoly by arrangement with the Jewish Agency. The attitude of Government, once it had established this policy, was to urge more and faster departures, and popular voices were heard (but not officially countenanced) advocating concentration camps or expulsion for such Jews as remained. Indeed, with the loss of their position in officialdom—even where, as in Telegraphs and Railways, they were with great difficulty replaced by imported Pakistanis—and of equal rights and opportunities in commerce, even the remnant of the ancient community could look to no hopeful future in 'Iraq. Nevertheless some thousands elected to remain, including many of the most

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

APPENDIX B

Table showing (1) *area and population of each liwā'; (2) qaḍhās of each liwā', including H.Q. area;* (3) *area (sq. km.) of each qaḍhā;* (4) *population of each qaḍhā.*

631
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361

Liwā'	*Area in sq. km.*	*Population*	*Qaḍhās with* (1) *area,* (2) *population*
Baghdad	20,000	805,000	Baghdad (1,900: 552,000); Kaḍhimiya (1,100: 114,000); Samarrā (15,600: 91,000); Maḥmudiya (1,450: 48,500).
Mosul	48,000	602,000	Mosul (12,900: 340,000); 'Amadiya (2,700: 50,000); Zakho (2,250: 37,000); Dohuk (2,250: 40,000); 'Aqra (1,950: 32,000); Sinjar (16,900: 32,000); Shaykhan (1,400: 24,700); Tall 'Afar (8,250: 45,500).
Baṣra	12,300	352,000	Baṣra (4,700: 206,000); Abu al-Khaṣib (4,000: 81,000); Qurna (3,650: 65,000).
Kirkuk	19,900	286,000	Kirkuk (7,000: 148,000); Kifri (5,300: 48,000); Chamchamal (2,400: 30,000); Ta'uq (5,200: 59,000).
Arbil	18,400	240,000	Arbil (3,500: 86,000); Makhmur (3,500: 44,000); Keui Sanjaq (1,900: 31,000); Rawanduz (5,500: 46,000); Raniya (2,100: 27,000); Zibar (1,950: 6,600).
Sulaymaniya	9,400	223,000	Sulaymaniya (3,000: 77,600); Ḥalabja (3,100: 71,000); Shahribazar (2,000: 38,000); Pishdar (1,250: 35,600).
Dulaym (H.Q., Ramadī)	45,400	193,000	Ramadi (15,600: 111,000); Faluja (4,750: 49,000); 'Ana (25,000: 33,600).
Ḥilla	5,300	262,000	Ḥilla (960: 81,000); Hashimiya (1,900: 52,000); Hindiya (1,200: 82,000); Musayib (1,200: 46,000).
Kut	16,000	225,000	Kut (4,000: 82,000); Ḥai (3,000: 67,500); Badra (3,800: 16,200); Ṣuwayra (5,250: 59,250).
Karbalā	6,000	277,000	Karbalā (5,600: 150,000); Najf (400: 127,000).
Diwaniya	14,900	384,000	Diwaniya (1,800: 63,000); Samawa (4,700: 82,000); Shamiya (2,900: 114,000); Abu Sukhayr (1,300: 79,000); 'Afaq (4,200: 46,000).
Muntafiq (H.Q., Naṣiriya)	14,150	370,000	Naṣiriya (5,500: 111,000); Rifa'i (3,200: 82,000); Suq al-Shuyukh (3,800: 109,000); Shaṭra (1,600: 68,000).
Diyalā (H.Q., Ba'quba)	16,000	273,500	Ba'quba (2,050: 94,500); Khaliṣ (3,600: 69,000); Khaniqin (3,750: 57,000); Mandali (6,500: 53,000).
'Amara	18,750	308,000	'Amara (8,650: 184,000); 'Ali al-Gharbi (5,750: 36,000); Qal'at Ṣalih (4,350: 88,500).
Northern desert province	94,700		Population nomadic, and included in adjacent liwās.
Southern desert province	75,700		

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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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

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End map (c)

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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End Map (d)

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1



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End Map (E)

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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End Map (F)

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CHAPTER VI

INITIATION OF ADMINISTRATION IN BAGHDAD WILAYET

In view of the divergence of opinion, both between London and Baghdad, and, to a lesser extent, between the local military authorities and Sir Percy Cox, both as regards the policy and the character of the administration to be set up in Baghdad, it is not surprising that those in charge of the Civil Administration in 'Iraq did not strictly adhere to the instructions laid down for their guidance; that the administration should have taken on aspects beyond the limits prescribed by H.M. Government; and that the immediate differentiation between the administration of Basra and Baghdad should be confined to a separation of administrative organization rather than to any appreciable alteration of spirit or character of the administration except in the Judicial System.[1]

Administrative Organization

Under the organization adopted after the fall of Baghdad a Deputy Chief Political Officer remained in charge at Basra while Sir Percy Cox took up his headquarters at Baghdad. Later, when Sir Percy became Civil Commissioner, September 1st, 1917, both wilayets were separated into divisions. Basra Wilayet, with the addition of Kūt, remained the same as in Turkish days. Its five divisions were: Basra, Qurna, Nāsiriya, 'Amāra and Kūt. Baghdad was divided into eight divisions: Baghdad, Sāmarrā, Ba'qūbā, Khānaqīn, Ramādī, Shāmiya, and Samāwa. To each of these a Political Officer was posted, as well as to 'Azīziya and to Karbalā. Under each Political

[1] *Infra*, pp. 128 ff.

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Officer, Assistant Political Officers administered subdivisions or districts. A Deputy Civil Commissioner assumed control of the Basra divisions until September, 1918, when the two wilayets, largely for political reasons, were merged and the administration directed from Baghdad.

Political Control and Revenue Administration

As at Basra, military exigencies largely controlled the situation. General Maude's own attitude to the Civil Administration had been in accordance with his views as to the necessity of establishing the unquestioned authority of the military authorities rather than with the spirit of the proclamation issued in his name after the fall of Baghdad. The appointment, often without reference to the Chief Political Officer, of military officials, many of whom knew nothing of Arab conditions or of Arabic, to civil administrative positions, gave no suggestion that he took seriously the statement 'I am commanded to invite you, through your Nobles and Elders and Representatives, to participate in the management of your civil affairs in collaboration with the Political Representatives of Great Britain who accompany the British Army'.[1] The Government by proclamation, with its harassing and sometimes unnecessary regulations, gave as little hint to the people of Baghdad as earlier regulations had given to the people of Basra, that the armies had 'not come into your Cities and Lands as Conquerors or enemies but as Liberators'.[2]

Nevertheless, Sir Percy Cox, concerned with the future as well as the present, deemed it essential to extend political control throughout the wilayet, as much as permitted by the military authorities and by General Maude's centralization of authority into his own hands. Such control could be best attained, as had been discovered in Basra Wilayet, by extending

[1] *Proclamations*, 1914-19, Proc. No. 9, p. 5. Text: App. I.
[2] Ibid., p. 6.

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numerous individuals, English, American and French. The atmosphere, in his opinion, was dominated by the Western Arabia viewpoint, the experts being lamentably ignorant of conditions in 'Iraq and even in Persia.[1] On the other hand, he himself created the impression that he was out of touch with conditions under which the Peace Conference was proceeding, and that he had little conception of the strength of Arab Nationalism or of the forces which had given rise to it.

In London, his appeals for an official pronouncement of the intentions of H.M. Government regarding 'Iraq were not fruitful. It was felt that until further progress had been made toward the settlement of peace, the telegram of February 14th must suffice.[2] The Secretary of State for India agreed that the Acting Civil Commissioner should make specific proposals, and suggested that Lord Curzon might help him in formulating a policy and in obtaining sanction for his plans.

The Acting Civil Commissioner bespoke the aid of Lord Curzon in obtaining an agreed scheme on which to build and an accepted policy by which he might be guided. His constitutional proposals, drawn up in February, were placed, by the arrangement of Lord Curzon, before the Interdepartmental Committee on Middle East Affairs on April 6th, at a meeting before which he appeared personally. His proposals for provinces (five instead of four proposed) in ' 'Iraq proper' were sanctioned, together with Provincial Councils for each. Divisional and Municipal Councils were to be developed and consolidated. Arab Advisers were to be appointed to the British heads of three Departments of State: Revenue, Justice and Education. The Arab Secretaries of the Divisional Councils were sanctioned as Advisers to the Political Officers, and Arabs were to be appointed Presidents of the Municipal Councils of Baghdad, Basra, and 'Amāra.

In deference, however, to Lord Curzon's *idée fixe* that nothing should be done to anticipate the decisions of the Peace Con-

[1] Wilson, op. cit., p. 116.

[2] Cited *supra*, p. 180.

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become the residuary legatee of the Empire whereby its constitution, its electoral laws, its judicial system, its revenue system, its attitude to minorities and its very spirit approximated those of the former regime. In addition, the ground was laid for the continuous struggle within the administration itself between those who preferred the customary ways and those who, educated in the scientific atmosphere of the West, maintained that 'Iraq must break away from her Ottoman traditions and that more up-to-date forms, imbued with modern ideas and a progressive spirit, must dominate the administration if they and their fellow countrymen were to be 'able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world'.[1]

In the re-division of the country into ten *Liwās*, thirty-five *Qādhas* and eighty-five *Nahīyas*, approximating the former Turkish divisions, the Council, on December 12th, exhibited one of its first tendencies to revert to the Ottoman system. The major new divisions, replacing the fourteen divisions of the British Civil Administration which, for the most part had been drawn on carefully considered tribal and ethnological lines, were: Mōsul, Kirkūk, Baghdad, Karbalā, Diyālā, Basra, 'Amāra, Dulaim, Hilla and Muntafiq.[2]

In accordance with the Turkish administrative system, the Council also proposed, on December 12th, that an 'Iraqī *Mutasarrif* should replace in each *Liwā* the British Political Officer who was to become the Divisional Adviser without executive functions. In each *Qādha* a *Qaimmāqam* was to become the responsible official, while a *Nahīya* was to be placed in charge of a *Mudīr*. To each larger *Liwā*, former Assistant Political Officers were to be appointed Assistant Advisers.

To this arrangement the High Commissioner agreed. He asked, however, that it be not applied to the Hilla *Liwā* until the return of the special Commission, headed by Ja'far Pasha, which

[1] Article 22, Covenant of the League of Nations.
[2] Kūt *Liwā*, formed of portions of surrounding *Liwās*, was added January, 1922.

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had been sent to the Euphrates area by the Council to study civil reorganization; to the Muntafiq *Liwā*, until the British troops had been withdrawn; and to the Kurdish districts until their future status had been decided. Sir Percy Cox had already approved of the creation of the Baghdad Municipal Council which, although sanctioned under the previous regime, had been so mistrusted and so hedged with limitations as to be valueless as an instrument of government. The new Council had full executive and financial powers, subject to the general supervision of the *Mutasarrif* of the *Liwā*.

Appointments to administrative offices were vested in the Council of State, subject to the approval of the High Commissioner, by Section XIV of the Instructions.[1] In practice, this arrangement was applied by the Council of State only to those posts for which the Sultan's *firmān* had been required under the Ottoman regime. For other posts, appointments were made on the authority of the Minister concerned. In all cases, however, it was understood that no appointments involving the displacement of British or Indian officials were to be proposed to the Council without previous consultation with the High Commissioner.

The actual transfer of power in the provinces awaited the re-establishment of comparative peace and stability. Not until January 10th, therefore, following the return of Ja'far Pasha and the Commission from the Euphrates area, was the Minister of Interior permitted to put forward his first list of administrative appointments.[2]

The principal criticism of the list came from Shī'a sources. Their original grievances, other than inherent opposition to the British-controlled provisional Government itself, had been

[1] Appendix VI.

[2] Only four major administrative appointments had been made previously by the Council, all in Baghdad and vicinity; Mahmūd Nādim Beg Tabaqjalī, *Qaimmāqam* of Mandalī, November 19th, 1920; Mumtaz Beg al'Daftarī, *Qaimmāqam* of Kādhimain, November 21st, 1920; 'Ahmad Beg, *Qaimmāqam* of Sāmarrā, December 1st, 1920; Rashīd Beg al-Khojah, *Mutasarrif* of Baghdad, December 11th, 1920.

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MAP I

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

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a little over five percent of the total. Expenditures on education, health and other social services, although still very inadequate, rose slightly so that they absorbed almost 21 percent of the total budget in 1951. Capital outlays have been extremely modest. Total new government investment outlays for civilian purposes have averaged only ID 2,700,000 annually in the period 1948-49 to 1950-51. Expenditures on public works and housing, excluding irrigation, absorbed on the average less than six percent of total government outlays in this period.

Economies have also been effected in recent years at the expense of the municipal and provincial administrations. By law, these were supposed to have assigned to them, in equal shares, the proceeds of the property and petrol taxes less the expenses of collection incurred by the central government. Actually very little of these taxes has been turned over to the local and provincial governments. For example, in the three years 1947-48 to 1949-50 the provincial administrations received only ID 175,000 out of a total of ID 2,626,000 due to them. Municipalities were similarly handicapped. The ability of local governments to carry out improvements and even to maintain existing facilities was correspondingly curtailed.

Characteristic Features of Government Revenues

The fiscal system in the past has been characterized by (1) the high proportion of revenues derived from indirect taxation, (2) light taxation of agriculture, and (3) considerable tax evasion and poor tax collection.

Indirect taxation is generally predominant in all underdeveloped countries, and Iraq is no exception. In the three-year period 1948-49 to 1950-51 indirect taxes contributed about 82 percent of all tax income and 59 percent of total budget receipts. Customs duties and excises accounted during these years for 71.5 percent of total revenues from indirect taxes, while taxes on agricultural produce, fish, and livestock brought to market (the so-called *istihlak* and *koda* taxes) contributed most of the remainder. Direct taxes—the so-called land tax, the property tax and the income tax—accounted for only 18 percent of total tax revenues and 13 percent of all government receipts. Income and surtaxes

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have been newly constructed do not appear at all on the records of the Planning Office. The Mission, in fact, found that many major details of developments such as civic centers, markets and the like, either were not shown in the plans or were contrary to the plans as prepared and filed. There were also instances where planned projects under construction were suddenly changed or stopped by a new mayor on his assuming office.

Cooperation of the central government with the local authorities has also been noticeably lacking. The Ministry of Education, without consultation with local officials, prepares school plans, showing not only the details of structures but also their location and distribution. Likewise, the Ministry of Social Affairs, without reference to local administration, prepares plans for hospitals, clinics, social centers, and housing schemes which form definite parts of the community. And, in similar fashion, the Ministry of Communications and Public Works prepares many plans for public works such as bridges, national highways and streets, and government structures designating details not only of construction but also of alignment, orientation and location. All these specialized planning activities are carried on with little or no coordination with the Planning Office in the Ministry of Interior. Even in Baghdad, where better cooperation between the municipality and the various government departments might be expected, a large school building was recently completed, abutting on a busy major thoroughfare, the proximity of which was dangerous for school children. The location was approved despite objections by the Planning Office.

Financial Difficulties

Financial difficulties have contributed to the failure of the municipalities to plan more effectively. A large part of their revenues, which are in any case small, is derived from a share in the petrol and property taxes, the proceeds of which are handed over to the central government and, in theory at least, reallotted to the provincial and municipal governments. In years of financial stringency, however, the government has withheld a large part of these taxes for itself.

For capital funds, the municipalities have to rely on occasional loans—or, in rare cases, grants—from the central govern-

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ment, which are usually forthcoming only at irregular intervals. The loans usually have to be amortized over a period of 10 years or less, which places an onerous burden on municipal finances. The municipal authorities in a number of northern cities, which were allocated funds in the fall of 1950 and had spent a large part of them at the time of the Mission's visit, were still in doubt as to whether they had received a grant or a loan. Uncertainty as to income or capital funds inhibits advance planning. Moreover, when the authorities do receive funds, they are apt to spend them as fast as possible for fear that, if they have not actually been spent, they may otherwise be withheld. The usual way of overcoming this situation, and possibly the only way in the circumstances, has been to build new streets, which are relatively easy to plan and execute. In addition, the municipality is by law entitled to recoup part of its expenses from the owners of land that has increased in value.

The provincial authorities, who are responsible for carrying out the projects of the central government and who might be expected to cooperate more closely with the municipalities, have been faced with similar difficulties. They, too, have had hand-to-mouth experience with capital expenditures. Nearly completed buildings have sometimes been left standing for months, because funds ran out before the construction could be finished. Furthermore, the projects to be undertaken are normally prescribed by the central government. Apparently, some advance on this procedure has been made recently and the *Mutasarrif* and the Provincial Administrative Councils have been given more latitude in planning their own development.

Planning in the Future

The opportunity now exists to substitute an entirely new approach to urban development for the old haphazard methods. An example of how well the development of a town can proceed, given the right spirit of cooperation, is provided by the small town of Bedrah, which lies near the Iranian border in Kut province and which has a population of about 4,000. This project involves the reconstruction of the old town on a new site.

Several streets had been constructed and 24 dwelling units were ready for occupancy when the Mission was in Iraq. Thirty more units were scheduled to be finished during the year. Besides

133 phrates join together in their lower courses to form the Shatt al-Arab, which is 185 kilometres long, navigable throughout its length, passes by the port of Basra, and flows into the Persian Gulf. In some places, this river is one kilometre wide. Baghdad is on the Tigris.

There are also several lakes in Iraq; the largest is Al-Hammar, with an area of 5,200 square kilometres.

132 The climate in the west of the country is Mediterranean and sub-tropical, with a long dry summer (lasting over seven months), frequent changes of temperature, with an average of 33.8° C.; in winter the average temperature is 9° to 10° C. In the east of the country, the average is the same in the summer, but the winter in the north-east is colder, with an average of 7° to 7.7° C. The rainfall varies from a yearly average of 38 to 40 centimetres in the highlands (probably twice as much in the mountains) to a maximum annual precipitation of 10 centimetres in the south-western desert region.

● 631 The country is divided administratively into the following fourteen provinces or "liwas": Baghdad, Mosul, Erbil, Kirkuk, Karbala, Hilla, Diwaniya, Kut, Amara, Basra, Diyala (chief town: Baquba), Dulaim (chief town: Ramadi), Muntafiq (chief town: Nasi-
RIYA), AND SULAIMANIYA.